I have often regretted the lack of serious thought in our public discussion. Armies of commentators, apparently remunerated for their qualities as argumentative writers and conversers, are scarcely ever seen to produce coherent reasonings, or to attend to the most obvious objections to their views. Here I will examine, as but one specimen of this universal tendency, an article lately published in The Observer, entitled, “It is foolish and self-indulgent for the anti-Starmer left to split the Labour vote” (26 May). I forego any advantage that my argument may derive from the political history of the author to be criticised: my sole intention is to expose bad habits of thinking, for the sake of improving the standard of public discussion.
Our author holds that it is wrong for Left-wing opponents of Sir Keir’s leadership of the Labour Party to support non-Labour candidates. She summarises the opinions of these Left-wing critics thus:
“The argument is threefold: there’s no meaningful difference between the Conservatives and Labour; Starmer supposedly can’t be trusted because he has dropped pledges he made in the 2020 leadership election to shift his party towards the centre; finally, the ‘Tories are toast’ and Labour can’t lose, so disgruntled left voters can safely vote for other parties, such as the Greens.”
These opinions, she says, are “comprehensively wrong”. Let us examine the arguments.
First, our author warns that Labour could lose in a number of marginal seats because of Left candidates, and disaffection with the party’s position on Gaza. But the question in dispute is not whether Labour may lose in some marginal seats; the question is whether they are likely to lose in so many seats that they will be unable to defeat the Tories. On the latter point, no clear proof is given: the evidence adduced by our author, even if it is accepted, only establishes that Labour faces a more difficult contest than what is suggested by the most sanguine predictions.
It may be that Labour loses in seats it might have won, owing to the causes our author mentions. But it does not occur to her that the attribution of responsibility for such losses is no simple matter. It cannot be assumed that Left critics of Labour are culpable, and that the Labour leadership is free of fault: this must be proven; and that proof must rest on a discussion of the objections these critics have made.
The Labour Party and its leadership have been urged, petitioned, cajoled, and pestered, to adopt a programme acceptable to its Left-wing critics. On questions of workers’ rights, public ownership, the NHS, and foreign policy—especially the man-made horrors that now torment Gaza, with British support—Sir Keir has received all the notice he could desire, that his opinions and policies are detested by large numbers of the electorate. Unless it is believed that Sir Keir is infallibly right, and his critics infallibly wrong, then Labour, too, must accept a share of the responsibility for its own losses. This principle is always appreciated by commentators when they speak of those voters who agree with them: then we are told that parties must be more attentive to the wishes and will of the people. But when voters adopt opinions at variance with those of the commentators, then we are told that they are irresponsible, selfish, indulgent, and instead of being persuaded—the ordinary democratic expedient—they are to be browbeaten.
It is evident that Sir Keir’s programme does not inspire the public at home, and will secure neither peace nor justice abroad. The analyses of Labour’s plans impel us to conclude that the greatest blame for all votes lost, must be laid on the Labour leadership. It is vain for Sir Keir and his friends to grumble, after years of assailing the Left, its principles, and its representatives, that the Left will not support him. If it is the duty of politicians to win favour, then here Labour has signally failed; and it is for Labour to pay the price.
Our author also errs in ignoring the fact that there are seats where Left independents, and other Left-wing non-Labour candidates, may win; indeed, there are seats where such candidates may have a better chance of winning than Labour. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that every Labour loss will let in a Tory: principled candidates may also enter Parliament, and play their traditional role of holding the larger parties accountable for their abuses. Perhaps it is Labour that should step aside in those seats, to make way for that beneficial class of MPs who are not bound by the prejudices of the dominant parties.
Next, our author attempts to exonerate Sir Keir of the charge of dishonesty, in the form of his abandonment of many of the pledges he made to Labour members during the 2020 party leadership election: this duplicity, she says, “is the product of a system in which the tiny unrepresentative slice of the electorate that is a party membership pick their leader before voters choose their prime minister. Anyone hoping to be PM would have to shift position between a leadership selection and a general election: a Labour leader’s most important job is to connect with potential voters, not to coddle members … For Starmer to have stuck to his 2020 leadership election pledges, instead of spending the past four years understanding voters, would have been fundamentally anti-democratic.”
It is remarkable that our author does not venture to deny that Sir Keir renounced his pledges: for the fact is undeniable. She aims, instead, to excuse this deceit, on the ground of political expediency: Sir Keir had to “shift position” to appeal to the broader public outside his party; she elevates this course even to the level of an overriding democratic duty. The doctrine she sets down, in short, is this: that it is right for politicians to deceive the public, when to do so is expedient, and increases their chance of winning power.
Of Sir Keir’s mendacity, no doubt can be entertained. The usual defence of his conduct has been to claim that, as circumstances have changed, it would have been wrong to keep to all his former commitments. Powerful objections can and have been made to this plea: it has never been demonstrated that circumstances have changed so much as to warrant the repudiation of nearly every original policy. But even if we admit that circumstances have changed, this defence is founded on a simple misunderstanding of language: a pledge is a solemn undertaking to adhere to a particular set of acts or principles; it is not an undertaking to be honoured or discarded at will. Sir Keir was not compelled by anyone to make the pledges that he did: it was open to him to make only the sorts of pledges, and as many, as he could uphold. On the best interpretation of his conduct, therefore, he was foolish, improvident, and reckless: for he pledged what he could not achieve, and swindled his followers as the consequence. On the worst interpretation, he lied flagrantly, and deserves all the disapprobation and censure that such conduct brings—conduct that is disdained in private life, and ought to be held in the greatest contempt when it appears in public life. Let it be noticed, that these are the actions that our author approves as the height of democratic duty.
We now turn to our author’s doctrine of the virtue of deceiving the public for political gain. It is difficult to conceive of a single more destructive and noxious principle, both for politics and society, than this. The relations between people which constitute social life, depend, to a remarkable degree, upon mutual trust. Family, friendship, work; public and private transactions in every shape, from the enjoyment of leisure, to the gravest matters of life and death, cannot subsist without some foundation of trust, enforced both by law, and by public opinion. The utterance of lies, in so far as it tears the fabric of mutual trust, tears the fabric of society itself; and in its place, there is universal suspicion, universal anxiety, and universal disquiet. Every public act of deception, therefore, unless it can be justified by some moral imperative, about as urgent as the survival of society itself, must be harshly denounced. And, indeed, we find that commentators are unanimously of the same opinion, except when it concerns the deceptions of their own party: at which point, they make a moral imperative of lying, and laud it to no end.
There is another flaw in our author’s doctrine, which equally seems to have escaped her notice. Sir Keir is not untrustworthy, she says, because he only lied as a matter of political expediency. This line of reasoning is so defective, that it is surprising anyone would dare to advance it publicly. In forming our estimate of politicians, and how they will act in the future, we have only one method: to consult past experience. For it is evident—and our author has given us no reason to believe otherwise—that a politician who lied to thousands of voters in one election, because it was expedient, will not scruple to lie to millions of voters in another election, if it is found expedient. A mind that is immune to the pangs of conscience in one case, must be supposed to be immune to them in the other. Once a politician relinquishes their integrity, therefore, there is no rational ground left to believe that they will honour any promise they make thereafter. The only course that might begin to repair their standing with the community, is an acknowledgment of their past wrongs, and a sincere effort to improve their future conduct; but Sir Keir has not shown the slightest inclination to do so.
The consequence of such disreputable tactics is, that voters cannot repose any confidence in Sir Keir, and government is reduced to a farce: because to demand that Sir Keir keeps to any promise, is as fruitful as demanding that a chameleon refrain from changing its colours. We cannot then feign shock, when voters refuse to join in this charade, or take to supporting demagogues. Sir Keir must therefore share blame for the withering of British democracy—for severing the bonds of trust that should regulate the intercourse between voters and their representatives.
We now come to the argument that Rishi Sunak and Sir Keir are not meaningfully different: from this our author vigorously dissents. She admits that Labour is too fiscally cautious, and that “it has effectively adopted the Tory macroeconomic worldview”, but again justifies this as expedient, and by the hope that Labour will do more in office than it seems. That there is some difference between Labour and the Tories is not in dispute: what is disputed is, whether the difference is great enough to make one side much more preferable than the other. Labour’s Left-wing critics, and many political observers besides, consider these differences to be minor; we who oppose Sir Keir, therefore, judge that more good would be done by electing Left-wing non-Labour candidates, than by augmenting Labour’s majority. Such candidates would advocate a more radical political programme, work to change public opinion, and strive to induce a Labour government to deliver more ambitious reforms.
We have only two points left to consider. First, our author says that one of Sir Keir’s weaknesses was the length of time he took “to clarify an interview … in which he gave the impression he thought Israel had the right to withhold power and food from Gaza.” It is more apt to say that Sir Keir unambiguously affirmed Israel’s “right” to cut off water and power to Gaza—not that he gave this “impression”. The questioner expressly asked whether a siege was appropriate; and Sir Keir replied that Israel had that right. His later “clarification” consisted of denying that this exchange took place, with no apology, and no remorse. Why our author presumes that Sir Keir’s statements should be taken as conclusive, is for the reader to ponder. Second, The Observer invites the public to submit letters “of up to 250 words” in response to articles such as these. Perhaps one explanation of why our commentators are so careless in their reasoning, is that more attentive members of the public are denied the space required to answer them.
Talal Hangari, 27 May
Notes in the Margins of the Days 